Nos derniers articles

This paper examines the Bowley solution in the context of #insurance contracts using the expected utility framework. Specifically, the paper analyzes a sequential game between a #policyholder and an #insurer, in which the policyholder selects the optimal #indemnity function and the insurer adjusts the pricing kernel to maximize expected #netprofit. The paper finds that the optimal safety loading factor increases with the policyholder's #riskaversion level and the #probability of zero loss. However, the paper also shows that the Bowley solution is #pareto dominated, meaning that both parties' interests can be further improved.

"... we characterize Pareto-optimal risk-sharing contracts in a market with multiple policyholders and one representative insurer. With minimal assumptions on the risk measures of the parties involved, we characterize Pareto optimality in terms of the minimization of a sum of the agents' risk positions, and we relate it to both the core and coalitional stability of an associated market game. In the special case of coherent risk measures, the optimal indemnity schedules are further characterized in explicit form, in terms of what can be called "worst-case probability measures". "