Nos derniers articles

"We describe a simple model of #insurance demand that can be applied to the #propertyinsurance, #liabilityinsurance, #lifeinsurance, and #healthinsurance markets. We also demonstrate how #riskaversion affects a variety of real-life insurance decisions made under conditions of #uncertainty, including how much the market will bear to pay for insurance administrative expenses and how demand varies for different types of #autoinsurance#coverage.”

"Our model yields richer separating Nash equilibria than pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection models, although separating Nash equilibria may not exist in some cases. It also retains some properties, for example, no full insurance and the positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk type, in those benchmark models. Our study on comparative statics indicates that, under some conditions and with some exceptions, the optimal indemnity and premium decrease with disutility from effort, increase with potential loss, and decrease with the initial wealth of the insured."