"There is a well-known conflict of interest between #liabilityinsurance #insurers and policyholders with respect to the decision to settle or litigate a #claim. This short note provides a simple graphical explanation for the problem and grounds it in the way the structure of the parties’ payouts drives their attitudes towards #risk. An optional appendix links the insights to the elementary mechanics of financial options.
Key findings:1. #masstort plaintiff lawyers do not primarily base their litigation and settlement strategy on defendants' #liabilityinsurance, except in cases of insolvency.2. Despite #insurance policies assigning control over defense to the #insurer, mass tort defendants typically retain control over their defense, even when they recover under these policies.3. Mass tort defendants usually use their own funds to settle #claims, seeking indemnification from liability insurers, if available, at a later stage.4. Many mass tort plaintiff law firms rely on non-recourse litigation funding, reminiscent of early forms of commercial insurance like bottomry and respondentia. An emerging insurance market is reducing the cost of this funding and may eventually replace it.
"We describe a simple model of #insurance demand that can be applied to the #propertyinsurance, #liabilityinsurance, #lifeinsurance, and #healthinsurance markets. We also demonstrate how #riskaversion affects a variety of real-life insurance decisions made under conditions of #uncertainty, including how much the market will bear to pay for insurance administrative expenses and how demand varies for different types of #autoinsurance#coverage.”